Joseph Fazzio, Maxine T. Fazzio And Fuel Exploration, Inc., A Colorado Corporation v. Phillips Petroleum Company, A Delaware Corporation, D & J Oil Company, A Partnership, Roosevelt Unit, Inc., A Nevada Corporation, David H. Monnich, Ballard Ward, First National Bank & Trust of Tulsa, National Banking Association, J.A. Houston, Fern Houston, First Security Bank of Utah, A National Banking Association, Zions First National Bank, A National Banking Association, John Does 1 Through 15 and their Heirs, Successors, Assigns And All Other Persons Unknown Claiming Any Right, Title, Or Estate Or Interest In Or Lien Upon The Real Property Described In The Pleadings Adverse To The Plaintiffs Ownership Or Clouding Their Title Thereto : Brief of Appellant by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983
Joseph Fazzio, Maxine T. Fazzio And Fuel
Exploration, Inc., A Colorado Corporation v.
Phillips Petroleum Company, A Delaware
Corporation, D & J Oil Company, A Partnership,
Roosevelt Unit, Inc., A Nevada Corporation, David
H. Monnich, Ballard Ward, First National Bank &
Trust of Tulsa, National Banking Association, J.A.
Houston, Fern Houston, First Security Bank of
Utah, A National Banking Association, Zions First
National Bank, A National Banking Association,
John Does 1 Through 15 and their Heirs,
Successors, Assigns And All Other Persons
Unknown Claiming Any Right, Title, Or Estate Or
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Taylor v. Phillips Petroleum, No. 19161 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4078
Interest In Or Lien Upon The Real Property
Described In The Pleadings Adverse To The
Plaintiffs Ownership Or Clouding Their Title
Thereto : Brief of Appellant
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Hugh C. Garner, Nicholas F. McKean, and Randy K. Johnson;
Attorneys for Appellant
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH FAZZIO, MAXINE T. 
FAZZIO and FUEL EXPLORATION, 
INC., a Colorado corporation, 
v. 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, D & J 
OIL COMPANY, a partnership, 
ROOSEVELT UNIT, INC., a 
Nevada corporation, DAVID H. 
MONNICH, BALLARD WARD, FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK & TRUST OF 
TULSA, National Banking 
Association, J.A. HOUSTON, 
FERN HOUSTON, FIRST SECURITY 
BANK OF UTAH, a National 
Banking Association, ZIONS 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a 
National Banking Association, 
JOHN DOES 1 through 15 and 
their heirs, successors, 
assigns and all other persons 
unknown claiming any right, 
title, or estate or interest 
in or lien upon the real 
property described in the 
pleadings adverse to the 
Plaintiffs ownership or clouding 
their title thereto, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* Case 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, UINTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
--
No. 19161 
FI l ED 
dlJN :.: '.l i:lCJ 
~----···--·--- .. -.-.. -__..._, 
Clor'.:. So;:to"1> Coot, Ul>h 
HONORABLE kICHAKD C. DAVIDSON, JUDGE 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ALA:J L. SULLIVAN 
HUGH C. GARNER 
NICHOLAS F. McKEAN 
RANDY K. JOHNSON 
HUGH C. GARNER & ASSOCIATES, 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-5660 
VA;< CUTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for the Defendant Phillips 
Petroleum Company 
)0 South Main Street 
Suite 1 bOU 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
J. KAllD HIRSCHI 
VAi< COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for tne Defendant Roosevelt 
~nit, Inc. 
SO South Main Street 
Suite 1600 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (S01) 532-3333 
:il::kLIN O. BAK£R 
RAY l~LJI;m£Y Ix NElll:.KER 
Attorneys for the Defendant David H. 
11ionnich 
4UU Deseret Building 
"dlt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
UAfURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN 
THE DISTRICT COURT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUt!ENT 
POI NT 1 
THE STANDARD ON APPEAL REQUIRES THAT 
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED 
COMPLAINT BE ACCEPTED AS TRUE AND 
INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS. 
PO llH I I . 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY 
RESOLVING FACTUAL ISSUES IN ITS 
DEC IS ION GRANTillG PHILLIPS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
A. The district court improperly •••. 
dismissed with prejudice the 
Plaintiffs' third and fourth causes of 
action when it found, as a matter of 
fact, that adequate notice of the 
default had not been given to Phillips 
B. The district court improperly 
dismissed Plaintiffs' first cause of 
action with prejudice on factual 
grounds. 
C. The district court failed to recognize 
the factual issues contained in the 
second cause of action of the Amended 
Compldint in dismissing it with 
prejudice. 
PAGE 
2 
2 
3 
10 
10 
12 
12 
23 
25 
POINT 111 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS 
FINDING THAT THE 1954 LEASE WAS 
SEPARATE FROM THE 1945 ANlJ l 94b LJ<:ASI::S, 
DISMISSING THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
WITH PREJUDICE. 
A. The interest of the parties in ... 
entering into the 1954 lease was a 
question of fact and not susceptible 
to determination under a motion to 
dismiss. 
B. The district court improperly 
ruled as a finding of fact that the 
parties did not intend for Phillips' 
interest in the subject parcel under 
the 1946 lease to merge into its 
interest under the 1954 lease. 
C. Phillips' acceptance of the 1954 lease 
acted as a surrender of its rights 
under the 1946 lease to the subject 
parcel and evidenced its intent to 
abandon those rights. 
D. The 1954 lease is a substitute 
contract for the 1946 lease and is a 
novation of Phillips' rights under the 
1946 lease. 
POINT IV .. 
THE 1946 LEASE WAS SEGREGATED BY THE 
CONTRACTION OF THE ROOSEVELT UNIT IN 
1954 EXCLUDING THE SUBJECT PARCEL FROM 
THE UNIT AREA AND PARTICIPATING AREA, 
THEREBY EXCLUDING IT FROM A 
PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF PRODUCTION 
ROYALTIES; AND THE EXCLUDED PARCEL 
COULD NOT BE HELD BEYOND THE PRIMARY 
TERM OF THE 1946 LEASE UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE UNIT AGREEMENT. 
CONCLUSION ......... . 
ii 
30 
33 
34 
36 
38 
4J 
CITATION OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Alphin v. Gulf Refining Co. • • 
39 F.Supp. 570 (D.C. Ark. 1941) 
Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis . 
107 F.2d 981 (6th Cir., 1939) 
Bjork v. April Industries, Inc. 
547 P.2d 219 (Utah 1976), ~
after remand, 560 P.2d 315, cert. 
431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 7634,~ 
L.Ed.2d 245 
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 
280 P.2d 453 (1955) 
Bowers v. Cottrell, 1 5 Ida. 221. 
( 1908) 
Bowman v. Cook, 101 Ariz. 366, 
419 P.2d 723 ( 1 !:166) 
denied 
1 57. 
96 P.936 
Buell Cabinet Co. v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431 
(10th Cir., 1979) 
Consolidated Uranium Mines v. 
Tax Commission, 4 Utah 2d 236, 291 P.2d 
895 (1955) 
Diamante v. Aubert, 68 Utah 582, 251 P. 
373 (1926) 
Dilts v. Brooks, 66 Mont. 346, . 
213P.Ld600 (1923) 
Elliot v. Whitney, 215 Kan. 256, 
S.!4 P.2d 699 (1979) 
Fenn v. Boxwell, 312 S.W. 2d 536 
<Tex. Civ. App. 19':>8) 
iii 
PAGE 
18 
20 
22 
12 
27 
33 
27 
26 
35 
33 
37 
27 
Ferfuson v. Hilborn, 402 P.2d 914 
(Oka. 1965) 
Fraunhofer v. Price, 594 P. 2d 524 
(Mont. 1 9 7 9 ) 
Goldblat v. Cannon, 95 Colo. 419, 
37 P.2d 524 (1934) 
Harris v. Alaska Title Guaranty Co 
510 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1970) 
Hartman v. Potter, 569 P.2d 653 
(Utah 1 979) 
Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1975) 
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Mullican, 
192 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. 1946) 
International Engineering Co. v. Daun 
Industries, 102 Ida. 363, 630 P.2d 155 
( 1 981 ) 
Kearns v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 
272 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1966) 
Kernan Livestock Farm, Inc. v. Multnomah 
County, 224 Or. 87, 355 P.2d 719 (1960) 
King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., Inc 
13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962) 
L&A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Construction 
Co., Inc., 608 P.2d b26 (Utah 1980) 
Liquor Control Commission v. Athas, 
121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441 (1952) 
Lyons v. Robson, 330 P.2d 593 
(Okla. 1958) 
Mason v. Jarrett, 234 S.W.2d 771 
(Ark. 1950) 
Neblett v. Placid Oil Co., 257 So.2.d 
167 (La. App. 1972) 
iv 
1 7 
34 
28 
12. 
28' 30 
28 
27 
27 
11 
16 
16 
18 
27 
Neff v. Jones, 288 P.2d 712 
1l)kla. 19)5) 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 
2113 F.2d 926 (10th Cir., 1954) 
Robison v. Hansen, 594 P.2d 867 
(Utah 1979) 
Sauder v. Mid-continent Petroleum Corp., •... 
292 U.S. 272 54 S.Ct. 671, 78 L.Ed. 1255 (1934) 
Scroggins v. Roper, 548 S.W.2d 
779 (Tex. Cir. App. 1977) 
Utah State Building Board v. Walsh •. 
Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 399 P.2d 
141 (1965) 
Woolums v. Simonsen, 214 Kan. 722, •• 
522 P.2d 1321 (1974) 
STATUTES & RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, §18-8-5 (1943) 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-26 (s) (1953) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, •.••• 
Rule 12 (b)(6) 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
2A Moore's Federal Procedure, •12.08 
Summers, Oi 1 and Gas, § §524, 525 
Thompson on Real Property, §46 7 5 
~illiams & Meyers, Oil & Gas Law,. 
1802, ~ ~· 
v 
')' 
~L 
6. 14. 
38 
22 
27 
21 
12 
4, 24 
24 
1 0 
10 
36 
27 
1 3 
39 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JU::il::Pll FAZZIO, MAXINE T. 
FA/: lO and FUEL EXPLORATION, 
I~C., a Colorado corporation, 
v. 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
PH I LLI PS PETROLEUM CUMf'AtlY, 
d Delaware corporation, D & J 
JIL COMPANY, a partnership, 
ROOSEVELT UNIT, INC., a 
Nevada corporation, DAVID H. 
>10Ni1 I CH, BALLARD WARD, FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK & TRUST OF 
TCLSA, National Banking 
Association, J.A. HOUSTON, 
FERN HOUSTON, FIRST SECURITY 
Mi~K OF UTAH, a National 
Hanking Association, ZIONS 
ii~ST NATIONAL BANK, a 
·:ational Banking Association, 
JUHi1 DUl::.S 1 through 1 5 and 
their heirs, successors, 
assigns and all other persons 
unknown claiming any right, 
citle, or estate or interest 
in or lien upon the real 
?roperty described in the 
~leadings adverse to the 
~la1nt1ffs ownership or clouding 
:~eir title thereto, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 19161 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, UINTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE RlCHAIHl C. lJ1\Vlll:1Ui~. Jlllll;r: 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is a quiet title action brought by Joseph 
Fazzio and Maxine Taylor as the owners of mineral interests in 
certain real property located in Uintah County, Utah and Fuel 
Exploration, Inc., a lessee of the Fazzio' s mineral interest, 
against Phillips Petroleum Company, its successors and assigns, 
which purport to claim an interest in the mineral estate of the 
Fazzios by virtue of oil and gas ledses executed by the 
Fazzios' predecessors in interest in the 1940's and SO's, and 
against other parties claiming an interest in the subject 
property adverse to, or constituting a cloud upon, Plaintiffs' 
interest. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Defendant Phillips Petroleum Company, joined by 
De fend ant Roos eve 1 t Lin it, Inc. , res ponded to the Mended 
Complaint of the Plaintiffs by filing a Motion to Dismiss, 
which was granted bv the Honorable Richrird C. 11;.ividson, J11d's'' 
of the Seventh Judicial District Court. 
3 
o·.1nsequently denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and 
:lotion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs, Joseph and Maxine T. Fazzio, 
!hereinafter referred to as the "Fazzios" or "Plaintiffs") own 
rnineral interests in the following described real property in 
Uintah County, Utah: 
Townshio 1 South, Range 1 West, U.S.M. 
Section 24: Sl/2 NWl/4. 
Also, beginning at a point 60.0 rods 
West of the Southeast corner of the 
SWl /4 of Section 24; and running thence 
West 60.0 rods; thence North 160.0 
rods; thence East 60.0 rods; thence 
South 160.0 rods to the place of 
beginning. 
Also, beginning at the Southwest 
corner of the SWl/4 of Section 24; and 
running thence North 160. 0 rods; thence 
East 40.0 rods; thence South 160.0 rods; 
thence West 40.0 rods to the place of 
beginning. (Containing 180 acres, more 
or less). 
These lands, and the lands involved in a companion 
case, Taylor, et al, vs. Phillips Petroleum Co., et al., (Case 
:lo. 191b0) are plotted on Exhibit "A" hereto. 
On November 30, 1945 the Plaintiffs' predecessors in 
t1terest, the parents and maternal grandparents of Maxine 
,·z1u, Leslie D. Taylor and his wife Audrey Whitlock, and 
't,1rd L. Whitlock and his wife, Nellie, entered into two 
,•Jrdte leases with the Defendant Phillips Petroleum Company 
1ereinafter referred to as "Phillips") covering lands in 
·)e,·r1.rns ~3 dn1J 2'+ of Township 1 South, Range 1 West, U.S.M., 
4 
and Sections 18 and Lu ot fuwnsr11f' I "''11!1, "'· 
U.S .M. (Paragraph 7 of the AmendPd Cnrnpl.ilrll rnd '.._ [) l t_ s ..... 
and "l3" thereto). These leases, which dre hereiridtler referre·.J 
to as the 1945 leases, were on printed forrns, the standarJ 
Producer Form 88 lease, used extensively throughout the westerc 
states. The leases were for primary terms of seven vears, and 
so long thereafter as oil and gas were produced from the 
property. They provided for a royalty of I/8th of anv oil, ~as 
or other hydrocarbons produced from the premises. Phillips, 
under these respective leases, was required to begin operations 
for drilling a well within one year from the date of the leas•. 
If operations did not commence within one year the lease was c 
terminate unless the lessee paid a "delay rental" in the dmounc 
of 25~ per acre per year to hold the lease from vear to vear 
for the primary term of the lease. 
At the time the Plaintiffs' predecessors in interesc 
entered into these leases with Phillips, Phillips was n1Jt 
authorized to do business in the State of Utah under §1 o-8-5 
Utah Code Ann. (1943), which statute was then in effect. 
Phillips became qualified to do husiness on June 14, IY4b 
(Paragraph 18 and Exhibit "U" 1Jf the Amended 1:urnpld1rit 
A subsequent lt:>ase, dated '.101.'t->r1DPr I~, 1 <.-J .n -"'dS 
obtained by Phillips from Nellie \Jh1tl.ic:e., 111c11 ·1·i•1 ii I ,,,,, 
5 
,,11,in1strdtor for the estate of Wilford L. Whitlock, and from 
Leslie lJ. Tdylor and Audrey Whitlock Taylor. (Paragraph 8 and 
Exhibit "C" ot the Amended Complaint). This 1946 lease, which 
is hereinafter referred to as the 1946 lease, differed from the 
1945 leases in that it only covered the lands located in 
Section L4. This readjustment may have been attributable to 
the deatn of Wilford Whitlock and the apportionment of his 
interest among the Plaintiffs' predecessors. The other land 
contained in the 1945 leases, which was also leased to Phillips 
by separate leases in 1946, is not involved in the present 
litigation. There was no actual change in the amount or area 
leased to Phillips, onlv a change as to which leases covered 
which property. 
Dis,niss). 
(Exhibits "A" and "B" to Defendant's Motion to 
The term of the 1946 lease was for six years from 
:iovember 20, l ':!46 -- in other words, the expiration of the 
orimary term of the 1945 and 1946 leases was the same time. A 
clause requiring seismographic work to be performed on the 
leased propertv contained in the 1945 leases was omitted from 
rne l~~o lease. The lessors were led to believe that this 
·1dn~e was the main reason for the execution of the 194b lease 
lf n•,rdpl1 ,!ii 11t the Alnended Complaint). 
6 
On November 7, 1950 Phillips entered into '" Unit 
Agreement for the Development dnd Operation of the tzoosevelt 
Unit. The definition of a "unit" as it applies here is the 
area included in the joint operations of all or part of an oil 
or gas bearing formation, without regard to the legal 
boundaries overlying the formation, so as to maximize the 
recovery and minimize the waste of the oil and gas and the 
economic resources from drilling unnecessary wells. All 
parties which have an interest in the unit share in the total 
production from the unit, usually in direct proportion to the 
amount of lands they have committed to the unit. A unit may be 
formed through agreement, or by order of an agency of the state 
or federal government, and may be comprised of one or several 
"participating areas." A participating area is all or a 
portion of the unit area to which production from wells located 
on the participating area is allocated and divided in 
proportion to the interest held by the mineral owners. There 
may be one or more participating areas to a unit. The history 
of the formation of the Roosevelt Unit is contained in Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Peterson 218 F.2d 1926 (10th Cir., 1':154), a 
case dealing with Phillips' right to unitize lands under 
lease. 
)5 
7 
Tne Roosevelt Unit appears to have had only one 
1Mrticipating area. The participating area was contracted down 
to its present size effective February 1, 1952 (Exhibit "G" of 
the Affidavit of Nicholas F. McKean), excluding all but the 
northernmost 80 acres of the lands leased by Phillips in 1946. 
Later, effective February 1, 1954, the entire Roosevelt Unit 
was contracted down to the size of the participating area. 
The parties entered into an agreement on March 11 
1952 whereby, notwithstanding the Unit Agreement, Phillips 
agreed to drill a well for the production of oil and gas on the 
parcel covered by the 1946 lease excluded from the Roosevelt 
Unit. (Exhibit "A" to the Supplement to the Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss). A well appears to have been 
drilled in that parcel in 1952, but was abandoned in 1954. 
'.~xhibit "B" to the Supplement). 
On October 25, 1954 Phillips entered into an oil and 
~as lease with the Plaintiffs' predecessors covering only that 
portion of Section 24 covered by the 1946 lease which had been 
excluded from of the Roosevelt Unit. (Exhibit "E" of the 
'l:nended Complaint). This lease, which is hereinafter referred 
'u as the 195~ lease, was on a standard Producers Form 88 with 
'•~1ticant modifications to certain clauses. Stricken from 
lease were provisions relating to the primary term and 
delay rentals holding the ledsc>. lnstt'dd, the· l(',J.~· ·er:iuired 
commencement of operations fur reworkirg and redrilling a well 
that had been previously drilled in the S\<1/4 of Section 24 
within six months, with no right to extend the lease by the 
payment of delay rentals. This lease was released by Phillips 
on April 28, 1955. (Exhibit "F" to the Amended Complaint). 
No further development has occurred on the lands 
excluded from the Roosevelt Unit. As indicated by the 
Affidavit of Joseph Fazzio and the exhibits thereto filed at 
the request of the district court, the Plaintiffs were in 
regular contact with Phillips from 1979 concerning the subject 
land and Phillips' lack of exploration or development thereon. 
On October 10, 1980 Carl Noel, on behalf of the Plaintiffs, 
wrote a letter to Phillips demanding release of the land for 
several reasons including Phillips' unreasonable delay in 
conducting any developmental operations upon the leasehold. 
(Paragraphs 49 and Sb of the Amended Complaint and Exhibit "C" 
of the Motion to Dismiss). 
A complaint was filed May 12, 1982 to quiet title 
against Phillips and its assignees and successors, and also 
against J .A. and Fern Houston as the grantees n'imed in a stL<': 
mineral deed executed by Lorna HeminP,wav, unr<"l.lt<'d tn thP 
Phillips leases. Un June 1 O, 1982 an Amended (>ir"pl.i Lilt w'is 
9 
tiled correcting certain minor errors in the names of the 
ra rt i es. 
Phillips responded to the Amended Complaint on July 
2b, 1982, by way of a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was 
Joined by the Roosevelt Unit, Inc. Other named defendants have 
filed disclaimers of interest, or in the case of David Monnich, 
a general denial by way of answer. J.A. Houston and Fern 
Houston could not be located by the process server and are 
presumed to be dead. 
A hearing was held on the Motion to Dismiss on 
:fovember '!, 1982, before the Honorable Richard C. Davidson. At 
the close of the hearing, Judge Davidson took the Motion under 
advisement and allowed counsel ten (10) days in which to 
supplement the record. On December 6, 1982 Judge Davidson 
issued a Minute Entry, and a Judgment was signed and entered 
December 30, 1982, dismissing the first, second, third, fourth, 
fifth and portions of the seventh causes of action with 
prejudice, and the fifth, sixth and portions of the seventh 
without prejudice. 
On January 14, 1983 a Motion to Reconsider the 
!l..,cision and a Motion for Leave to Amend were filed by the 
lciilltiffs. These motions were denied by the district court, 
I this appeal was consequently taken. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD Oil APPEAL REQIJ l RES fHAT Ti!E /"ACTS 
ALLEGED IN THE M1ENUEU COMPLA1Il1 H~ ACCEPTED AS 
TRUE AND INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT t10ST 
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS. 
As noted above, Phillips' response to the Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint was by way of a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion was 
joined by the Defendant Roosevelt Unit, Inc. The only answer 
filed was from the Defendant David Monnich, and was basically d 
general denial. Although the record has been supplemented by 
both parties through memoranda supporting and opposing the 
Motion to Dismiss, no discovery has been permitted, and there 
has been no responsive pleading by Phillips as to any of the 
factual allegations contained in the Amended Complaint. The 
district court chose to dismiss four counts of the complaint 
with prejudice and two counts without prejudice. Leave to 
amend was denied. 
Dismissal of a complaint with prejudice, before trial 
and before an answer has been filed by the defendant is a 
drastic measure, particularly in a factually complex case such 
as the present one. Such a dismissal is neither just nor 
necessary in the eyes of most legal authorities, and has been 
looked upon with disfavor by this Court. 2A >loorl', >lo<Ht' 0 S 
Federal Procedure, Paragraph 12.08 (2d Ed. 1:18Jl, •Jrl Fecleril 
11 
Rule lL(bJ (bJ, which is almost identical to the Utah version, 
Slrttes as follows: 
A [complaint] may be dismissed on motion if 
clearly without any merit; and this want of 
merit may consist in an absence of law to 
support a claim of the sort made, or of facts 
sufficient to make a good claim, or in the 
disclosure of some fact which will necessarily 
defeat the claim. 
But a complaint should not be dismissed for 
insufficiency unless it a~pears to a certainty 
that plaintiff is entitle to no relief under 
any stated facts which could be proved in 
support of the claim. Pleadings are to be 
liberally construed. Mere vagueness or lack 
of detail is not grounds for a motion to 
dismiss, but should be attacked by a motion 
for a more definite statement. (Emphasis in the 
original, citations omitted). 
The standard by which the Utah Supreme Court has 
~easured appeals from motions to dismiss is stated in ~ 
Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., Inc., 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 
P.2d 254, 256, (1962): 
In the face of the motion to dismiss the 
complaint, the trial court and this court 
on review, are obliged to survey its 
allegations in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff; and in a similar manner to 
indulge in its favor all reasonable 
inferences as to proof that may be adduced 
thereunder. From the standpoint of the 
administration of justice it is wise and 
desirable to adhere to a policy of being 
reluctant to turn a party out of court 
without trial. lt can justifiably be 
done only if the party could not in any 
event establish a right to recover. 
12 
See also Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 1'!1 1lltah 1'17) ,,.Jno 111ms 
v. Simonsen, 214 Kan. 722, 522 P.2d IJ~l (1'174). 
In this appeal the facts alleged in the Amended 
Complaint must be taken as true. This much is admitted even bv 
the opposing party (Page 4 of the Reporters Transcript of 
Hearing on Motion Proceedings before the Honorable Richard C. 
Davidson, November 9, 1982 [referred to hereinafter as 
"Transcript"]). The inferences to be drawn from the facts 
alleged in the Amended Complaint are to be viewed from a 
perspective which is most favorable to the Plaintiffs. In no 
event should the Plaintiffs be precluded from their right to a 
trial on the merits at this level, even before discovery has 
taken place, unless "it appears to a certainty that plaint1ff 
would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which 
could be proved in support of the claim." Blackham v. 
Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955). As will be 
shown below, the Amended Complaint dismissed by the district 
court clearly does allege facts, which, if taken as true 
together with inferences deduced therefrom, would entitle 
Plaintiffs to some relief. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED fW Rr~SULVl!H; FAC ['llAL 
ISSUES IN ITS DECISION GRANTl<i1; PHILLJPS' 111JJ1J;, i'' 
DISMISS. 
A. The court improperly dismissed withuut 
prejudice the Plaintiffs fifth anJ sixth causes of 
1 3 
action when it found, as a matter of fact, that 
adequate notice of breach of implied covenants had 
not been given to Phillips. 
The Amended Complaint alleged in the fifth and sixth 
causes of action that Phillips had breached implied covenants 
ot the leases in question to develop the subject property and 
to further explore for oil and gas. 
The lessee's convenants implied in an oil and gas 
lease for development and further exploration are based upon 
the requirement of cooperation, integral to any contractual 
relationship. The lessor to an oil and gas lease gives up the 
exclusive privilege of exploration, and drilling for and 
extracting oil and gas from the property. In return, the 
lessee promises to give the lessor a royalty on production 
under the lease. The benefit of the lease to the lessor 
is therefore intimately tied to the diligent operation of the 
leasehold by the lessee. If the lessee does nothing to develop 
the premises, lessor's returns on the lease are delayed 
1ndetinitelv. The requirement of cooperation demands that the 
lessee conduct its operations in a manner which will accomplish 
the µuroose, i.e., the development of the resources underlying 
c1e rrernises (See, generally, 5 Williams & C!eyers, Oil and Gas 
-"-':_, ~di'l, ~ ~· and citations therein). 
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This requirement of cooperdtion which demar' that 
the lessee act in a manner reasonably Jesigned to promote the 
interests of the lessor in the lease is heightened when the 
lease is committed to a unit area, since the possibilities for 
abuse of the lessor's interest by the lessee are much greater. 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, supra, and 
various exhibits to pleading and memoranda (Exhibits "F" and 
"G" to the Supplement to Response to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, Affidavit of Joseph Fazzio and exhibits thereto and 
Exhibit "H" to the Affidavit of Nicholas F. McKean) indicate 
that there was great opposition to the formation of the 
Roosevelt Unit and to the inclusion therein of several leases 
because of the fear that Phillips would use this as a tactic to 
hold the leases as long as possible without exploration or 
development of the natural resources under lease. The Peterson 
case discusses what should be the mutual benefits to parties to 
an oil and gas lease which has been joined to a unit and the 
duties owed by the lessee to the lessor to ensure that the 
lessor receives these benefits: 
The practice of unitization by a power 
granted the lessee in advance, it faithfully 
carried out, will be fair and profitable both 
to the lessor and lessee, dnd is vital to the 
oil and gas industry in the interest of 
conservation of both natural and ffidteridl 
resources. It should be upheld, alrhuugh tho' 
1 5 
ground of power is in general terms, because 
it is subject to implied terms that will 
prevent arbitrary and unfair dealing, will 
require compliance with the implied covenants 
in the lease for the benefit of the lessor 
and will oppose a rigid standard of good faith 
on the part of the lessee. (At 933). 
As is obvious from this case, the potential for abuse by 
the lessee when joining a lease to a unit is enormous. The lessee 
can commit a very small portion of the lease to a unit so that the 
lessor will not be fairly compensated for his lease. The court 
likened the relationship between the lessor and the lessee under a 
unit agreement to be that between principal and agent. The agent 
can do nothing adverse to the interests of the principal without 
the principal's full knowledge and consent. The court stated: 
The agent owes the duty to exercise a 
high degree of good faith and loyalty for 
the furtherance and advancement of the 
interest of his principal. 
Where there is also a lessor-lessee 
relationship the agent-lessee is also 
obligated to keep and perform the implied 
covenants of his lease. 
A lessee is bound by implied covenants of 
of the lease to diligently explore and 
develop the lease, and to do so under a 
fair unitization plan, if unitization is 
affected; to market the production if oil 
and gas is found in paying quantities; to 
do that which an operator of ordinary 
prudence, having due regard for both lessor 
and lessee, would do; and, in the case of 
unitization to act fairly and in good faith, 
with due regard for the lessor's interest, 
and to provide for a fair apportionment of 
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the oil produced. The lessee clearly m1 
not act arbi.trarily or capriciously. I·,: ':134). 
The Amended Complaint allesed that notice of 
Phillips' breach of these implied covenants was given to 
Phillips, specifically identifying a letter from Carl Noel, 
representing the interest of the Plaintiffs, to Phillips. The 
district court ruled in its Minute Entry, which was 
incorporated by reference into the judgment, as follows: 
These actions appear to be premature in 
that adequate notice of default and 
opportunity to correct has not been given 
to Defendant Phillips. For this reason, 
Plaintiffs' fifth and sixth causes of action 
are dismissed without prejudice. 
After the ruling Plaintiffs requested leave to amend 
their complaint to allege that notice had been given 
generally rather than allege specifically that the letter from 
Carl Noel constituted notice. The Motion for Leave to Amend 
was denied, without comment by the district court. 
The district court, when ruling on a motion for 
summary disposition of a case, cannot permit itself to act as 
the finder of fact. Rather, pleadings must be accepted as true 
and all inferences to be drawn therefrom should be in favor of 
the Plaintiff and against the moving party. L & A Drvwall, 
Inc. v. Whitmore Construction Co. Inc., 608 P. 2d 626 (Utah 
1980); Liquor Control Commission v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 2c+l 
1 7 
P.2rl 441 (1952); Fraunhofer v. Price, 594 P.2d 324 (Mont. 
I 9 7 <J) • 
By its Minute Entry and Judgment, the district court 
acted as the finder of fact, ruling that no adequate notice had 
been given of Phillips' breach of covenants implied in the 
lease. 
The adequacy of notice and whether notice was 
actually given are clearly questions of fact. Phillips, before 
the district court, argued that "notice" of breach of the 
implied covenants must be a formal written document specifying 
the party charged with the breach, identifying the nature of 
the breach, notifying the breaching party of the breach and 
demanding that the breach be remedied or cured, or that the 
contract or agreement be cancelled. Yet in none of those cases 
cited by Phillips does it appear that effective notice can be 
given only through such a formal instrument, and that nothing 
else will suffice. 
Phillips ignores the purpose underlying the judicial 
policv requiring notice to be given to the party breaching an 
implied covenant of an agreement. The purpose of notice is to 
make the breaching party aware of its breach and to give that 
••rtv an opportunity co cure the breach. 
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For this reason, the focus in similar casec; .1as not 
been whether such a formal instrument <lf "nutice" h.1s been 
served upon the breaching party, but, rdther, an inquiry int•l 
the state of mind of the party charged with the breach of the 
implied covenant; that is, whether the breaching party knew of 
its breach of the covenants it had taken upon itself in 
entering into the lease. An example is Lyons v. Robson, 330 
P.2d 593, 596 (Okla. 1958) which was an action seeking 
cancellation of an oil and gas lease due to the failure of the 
lessee to develop portions of the land under lease. The 
defendant attacked the sufficiency of the notice of breach of 
the implied covenant to develop and the court ruled as 
follows: 
On the question of notice the rule applied 
is that what constitutes a reasonable notice 
is a question of fact to be determined from 
the circumstances of each case. 
In Brown v. Schaffer, Okl. 325 P.2d 743, it 
was held that no particular form of notice to 
further develop is required. Written notice 
is not necessary. 
We are convinced that the action of the 
plaintiffs in the present action made it 
known to the defendant that it was the 
desire of the plaintiffs that the defendants 
either release the property or further develop 
it. 
In the case of Alphin v. Gulf Refining Companv, JY 
F.Supp. 570 (D.C. Ark. 1941 ), an oil dnd g,as LecJse Wds exec11t• I 
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in April of 1919. No wells were drilled under the lease after 
lj!l and the lease was assigned to the defendant in 1936. One 
,,f the plaintiffs spoke with the vice president of the 
defendant company concerning lack of development on the land, 
and was advised that the defendant was "not going to do 
anything with it unless there was some development in the 
vicinity that would warrant them drilling it." On March 23, 
1938 the plaintiffs addressed a letter to the defendant 
formally requesting an execution of a release of the lease 
because they considered the defendant's inactivity on the lease 
to he an abandonment and forfeiture of the lease. 
As stated by the court: 
This testimony is not denied, but counsel 
ingeniously argue that the action on the 
part of the plaintiffs was nothing more than 
a notice, which in itself was an attempt to 
declare forfeiture and that the mere 
announcement by the lessee, the defendant 
company, of an intention not to drill, would 
not excuse the lessor's failure to give 
further notice. 
It is contended that the action of the 
plaintiffs did not amount to a demand for 
compliance with the covenant to develop. 
This argument was not accepted by the court. The 
cuurt, referring to the testimony stated: 
Certainlv the defendant company knew from 
that conversation that the plaintiffs 
expected the defendant company to comply 
with the covenants of the lease. A few 
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Also, this Court in 8jork v. April lndustri s, Inc., 
547 P.2d 219, 220 (Utah l':J76) appeal after remand, '.:>bO P.2d 31), 
cert. denied 431 U.S. 930, ':J7 S.Ct. 7634, 53 L.Ed. 2d. 245 
stated, "Demand is not necessary where both parties have equal 
knowledge of the contract provisions, or where the defaulting 
party denies the allegation." 
It is abundantly clear from the facts alleged in the 
Amended Complaint, and from inferences derived therefrom, that 
Phillips has not acted in good faith in discharging its duties 
under the lease and unit agreement. Production from the unit 
is low (Paragraphs 44 through 47 of the Amended Complaint). 
Only a small portion of the lands Phillips claims to hold 
under lease can participate in the royalties from production 
from the unit. Phillips has not attempted to develop these 
lands since 1954. And yet Phillips purports to hold these 
lands by the payment of 25f an acre each year ad infinitum, or 
so long as there is any production from the Roosevelt Unit. 
The inequities of this certainly cannot be said to be unknown 
to Phillips. See, Sander v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. 292 
U.S. 272, 291, 54S.Ct. 671, 674, L.Ed. 1255 (1954); Neffv. 
Jones, 288 P.2d 712 (Okla. 1955). But Phillips insists it muse 
be given formal written notice of its duties and covenants Lu 
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rhe Plaintiffs and notice of the fact that it has been in 
oreach for all these years. 
The record indicates that as early as 1951 the 
Plaintiffs predecessors in interest were concerned with 
Phillips' procrastination in developing the property under 
lease. (Exhibit "F" to Supplemental to Plaintiff's response to 
:,lotion to Dismiss). The affidavit filed by Joseph Fazzio and 
its supporting exhibits indicates that Mr. Fazzio was in 
contact with employees of Phillips from November 1979. His 
disgruntlement with the lack of operations upon the leasehold 
~ropertv is quite obvious. For Phillips to claim, and for the 
district court to rule without even the benefit of weighing the 
evidence, that these conversations, letters and demands did not 
~ive Phillips notice that it was breaching its responsibilities 
as lessee to the Plaintiffs to develop the leasehold and to 
further explore for other potentially productive horizons 
strains the imagination. 
H. The district court improperly dismissed Plaintiffs' 
first cause of action with prejudice on factual 
grounds. 
The First Cause of Action of the Amended Complaint 
, i~v,ed char at the time the 1945 leases were executed, 
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Phillips did not have authority to conduct business within LhP 
State of Utah. As such, under Section 18-8-5 Utah Code Ann. 
1943, the leases were void. The Amended Complaint went on to 
allege that Phillips then induced Plaintiffs' predecessors in 
interest to execute another lease in 1946 by misleading them as 
to the validity of the 1945 leases. The Plaintiffs' 
predecessors relied upon this misrepresentation to their 
detriment in executing the 1946 lease. 
The district court dismissed the first cause of 
action with prejudice. As stated in its Minute Entry: 
"The court finds that the Plaintiffs or their 
predecessors in interest had notice or could 
have discovered the facts which they now claim 
to give rise to the allegation of fraud on the 
part of Phillips Petroleum." 
The court went on to cite §78-12-26(3) Utah Code Ann. 
1953 as the applicable statute of limitations barring the 
Plaintiffs' claim against Phillips. 
It is obvious from the language of the Minute Entry 
that the district court invaded the territory of the trier of 
fact. There is nothing in the record evidencing that the 
Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest had actual notice 
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.,f the deception of Phillips at any time prior to 1981. The 
Jistrict court, in stating that the Plaintiffs could have 
discovered the fraud, speculates as to whether the Plaintiffs 
should have reasonably had notice. This is clearly a factual 
and not a legal issue, and therefore outside the scope of the 
district court's discretion on a motion to dismiss. 
C. The district court failed to recognize the factual 
issues contained in the second cause of action of 
the Amended Complaint in dismissing it with 
prejudice. 
The second cause of action of the Amended Complaint 
alleged that the 1946 lease was executed by the Plaintiffs' 
predecessors in interest to correct errors contained in the 
1945 leases. It was the intention of the Plaintiffs' 
predecessors in interest to convey a new interest to Phillips 
beyond that which they intended to convey in 1945. Since the 
1946 lease related back to the 1945 leases, and since it was 
the intent of the lessors for it to do so, the 1946 lease 
inherited and suffered from the same defects of the 1945 leases 
and was void. 
The district court in its Minute Entry ruled on the 
•~cund cause of action as follows: 
The Court having reviewed the 1946 leases 
(sic) finds that the leases (sic) were 
given "in correction and in lieu of two 
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leases." 
This language clearly shows that the l9q6 
leases (sic) were new leases (sic) which 
replaced the 1945 leases. In addition, the 
differing descriptions also show the 1946 
leases (sic) to be new. Consequently, the 
1946 leases (sic) are valid and the 
Plaintiffs second cause of action is 
therefore dismissed. 
The court accepted Phillips' argument that the 1946 
lease was a new lease replacing the 1945 leases. But the 
district court failed to see from the facts plead, and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, that it was the intent of the 
Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest not to make a new lease, 
but merely to make corrections in the 1945 leases. It should 
be noted that the 1946 lease was expressly modified so that the 
end of the primary term would be on the same date as the 1945 
leases. The 1946 lease omitted a clause contained in the 1945 
leases requiring seismographic work to be done on the property 
within a year, but this work had been done prior to the 
execution of the 1946 lease. Finally, there is a difference 
between the description of the property covered by the 1945 
leases and the 1946 lease. As noted in the Statement of racts, 
all land omitted from the 1946 lease was leased by Phillips 
under other leases (Exhibits "A" and "B" to Defendants' '·lotion 
to Dismiss). 
A lease is a conveyance. Consolidated llrani111n li1i<·' 
v. Tax Commission 4 Utah 2d 236, 291 t'.2d 8':i'l 1l:J':l'J1. 11 
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should be construed in a manner similar to other conveyances. 
~rnggins v. ?aper, 548 SW. 2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). A 
c,irrection deed relates back to the original conveyance and 
takes its validity from that conveyance. Kernan Livestock 
Farm, Inc. v. Multnomah County, 224 Or. 87, 355 P.2d 719 
\1%0); Fenn v. Boxwell, 312 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); 
ifason v. Jarrett, 234 S.W.2d 771 (Ark. 1950). If the original 
conveyance is void then it is incapable of reformation by an 
instrument intended to correct it without a showing that it was 
the express intent of the parties to ratify the void 
conveyance. Buell Cabinet Company v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431 
(llJth Cir., 1'179); Kearns v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 272 
'LY.S. 2d 535 (1966); 9 Thompson, Thompson on Real Property, 
Section 4675. 
The case of Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, ':16 P. 
93b (1~08) provides an illustration of this rule of law. 
There, a mother executed certain deeds in favor of her daughter 
~hich were never delivered nor recorded. The deeds were later 
recorded by the daughter without the knowledge or consent of 
the mother. The county recorder later requested that the 
.n,>tr1er execute a correction deed because there was an error in 
·~e Jescript1on contained in one of the deeds. The daughter 
'! no knuwledge of this request by the county recorder. The 
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delivery and intent on the p.-nt ut the mother to cunvev the 
property to her daughter. The correction deed executed by the 
mother at the request of the county recorder was also 
ineffective to pass title to the daughter. The court 
explained: 
The former deed being void, and the latter 
deed being executed to correct an error, 
and not for the purpose of conveying title, 
does not amount to a ratification of the same, 
or pass title thereto. (At 942) 
rhe facts as alleged indicate that there was no 
intent on the part of the Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest 
to execute a new lease in 1946 which would breathe new life 
into the void 1945 leases. 
The face of the 1946 lease itself contains 
ambiguities that would require the court to look further into 
the facts surrounding its execution. The 1946 lease states 
that it is "in correction and in lieu of" the 1945 leases. A 
correction deed is generally used to correct errors in the 
original deed and not as a substitute for the original deed. 
The words "in lieu of" do not necessarilv implv the second 
instrument is a substitute for the first. Humble Oil C. 
Kefining Co. v. i·!ullican, 192 S.,-l.2d 7711 1[c>x. l'-i-101. 
Generally, the purpose for the corre·~ti,1n c•r scii,,;r ir_11r,• ·le•« 
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,•_,ir"'d on che fdce of Che second instrument. Nebletc v. Placid 
ud l,o., 257 So.:Zd 167 (La. App. 1972). 
The intenc of the parties with respect to the 
incerpretation of a written instrument is to be drawn from the 
four corners of the instrument. Hartman v. Potter, 569 P.2d. 
h53 \Utah 1979). However if the instrument is ambiguous or 
susceptible to differing interpretations, the intent cannot be 
ascertained by looking to the document itself and other facts 
must be examined to divine the parties' intent. As stated in 
International Engineering Co. v. Daun Industries, 102 Idaho 
JoJ, 6JO P.2d 155, 1'.J7 (1981): 
\fuere the language of a written agreement 
is clear and una~biguous, the trial court 
will give effect to the language employed 
according to its ordinary meaning, 
determination of its meaning and legal 
effect being a question of law. 
But, when the terms of a written contract 
are ambiguous, its interpretation and 
meaning become a question of fact and 
instrinsic evidence may be considered by 
the trier of fact in an attempt to arrive 
at the true intent of the contracting 
parties. In doing so the trier of fact 
may consider the objective and purpose of 
the particular provisions and may also 
scrucinize che circumstances surrounding 
che formation of contract. If the contract 
1s reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretation, it is ambiguous. (Citations 
ommicedl. 
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See also Neblett v. Placid Oil Cu., S_.':.11'._r_:J_; llumbll' Oi 1 
v. Mullican, supra. 
From the facts plead and from the inferences that shouL 
drawn from those facts in favor of the Plaintiffs, it would appedr 
that there was no intent to ratify the void 1945 leases by the 
Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest by their execution of the I~,, 
lease. This ambiguity is susceptible to resolution only after 
evidence relevent to the intent of the parties at the time of the 
execution of the 1946 lease are examined. It is premature to 
resolve such a question of fact by a motion to dismiss before 
Defendant has filed an answer and discovery has been allowed. 
III. THE UISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THE 1954 
LEASE WAS SEPARATE FROM THE 1945 AND 1946 LEASES, 
DISMISSING THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION WITH PREJUDICE. 
A. The intent of the parties in entering into the 
1954 lease was a question of fact and not 
susceptible to determination under a motion to 
dismiss. 
The third cause of action of the Amended Complaint recite 
the fact that the Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest entered inc,' 
two leases dated November 30, 1945, a subsequent lease in l 94b, [~, 
Agreement of 1952, and a third lease in October of 1954. 
lease was released in April of 1955. The Amended CompLnnc dlc' 
that the release of the 19)4 lease acted _;s ,J r<'lc>dse ,it 1 I 1 1 
interest Phillips had in that parcel of land. 
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The district court, in its Minute Entry, ruled on the third 
wcP uf action as follows: 
The Court finds the 1954 lease did not include 
all the lands covered by the 1946 leases (sic) 
and therefore was a separate and distinct 
lease. When the 1954 lease was released in 
1955, the 1946 leases (sic) were left 
undisturbed. For that reason, Plaintiffs 
third cause of action is dismissed. 
The district court left unanswered the question of why the 
~rties entered into the 1954 lease in the first place if the 1946 
ledse was valid. The court makes mention of the fact that the 1954 
;ease did not include all the lands covered by the 1946 lease. What 
ts inconsistent in the district court's decision is that it held the 
JQ46 lease to be a substitute for the 1945 leases, even though this 
'.ease did not cover all lands included in the 1945 leases, and yet 
;dled that the 1954 lease was a new and separate lease not affecting 
~ne 1 940 lease. 
The Plaintiffs' predecessors joined the Roosevelt Unit 
.\~reement (Exhibit "B" to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss), but on 
chat same day another agreement was executed by Phillips and the 
'Liintiffs' predecessors in interest whereby Phillips agreed that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Unit 
Agreement for development and operation of 
the Roosevelt Unit (I.Sec. No. 886) to which 
the above described lease may have been 
committed by the Lessee or Lessor pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 12 of said Lease 
or otherwise, unless Lessee shall on or before 
November 12, 1952, commence or cause to be 
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commenced operations for the drilling of ; 
well for oil and gas at a location of L~ssees 
selection on the above described lands dnd 
thereafter drill such well in accordance with 
provisions of such Unit Agreement and an 
approved plan for development thereunder, 
the said (1946) lease shall terminate. 
(Exhibit "A" to the Supplement to Plaintiffs' Response to the Mo tic 
to Dismiss). 
Although a well appears to have been drilled pursuant to 
this agreement, it was a poor producer, plagued with problems and~ 
abandoned in 1954. (Exhibits "B", "C", "D", "E" & "G" Supplement 
Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss). The 1954 lease was the 
executed, requiring Phillips to rework the well within six months c' 
release the lands, with no right to extend the term by the payment 
delay rentals. This certainly raises a factual question as to the 
intent of the parties. At the very least it points to the 
possibility that Phillips and the Plaintiffs' predecessors struck a 
new deal, modifying Phillips' rights to hold these lands outside Cl, 
unit participation area without actual production on the lands. 
There are several legal theories supporting the Plaintif; 
contention that the intent shown by these documents indicates thJI 
Phillips did not claim its interest in the subject property under:· 
1946 lease, but rather by the 1954 lease and that when it released 
the 1954 lease it released all interest it held in the subject pac. 
which was excluded from the participating area of the Roosevelt 
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nit. These theories are discussed in more detail below. It was an 
1 r,ir for the district court to dismiss the third cause of action 
.ccn Lo do so required the court to make a factual determination 
regarding the intent of the parties in the execution of the 1954 
lease. 
B. The district court improperly ruled, as a finding of fact 
that the parties did not intend for Phillips' interest in 
the subject parcel under the 1946 lease to merge into its 
interest under the 1954 lease. 
The third cause of action states that it was the intent of 
tne parties in their execution of the 1954 lease that Phillips' 
tnterest under the 1946 lease in the subject parcel would merge into 
the 1YS4 lease. A release of that lease would thereby release all 
interest Phillips claimed in the subject parcel. Before the district 
court Phillips argued that, under the common law, merger would not 
have occurred for various technical reasons. However, the common law 
approach to merger, with its automatic and often unintentional 
effects, has been almost universally rejected. 
The modern doctrine of the merger of two interests in land 
in a party holding them simultaneously is primarily a question of the 
tntention of the parties, gathered from their express statements or 
lied from the surrounding circumstances. Bowman v. Cook, 101 
)bb, -+lY P.2d 723 (1%b); Goldblat v.Cannon, 95 Colo. 419, 37 
,1_, (i':IJ4J; Dilts v. Brooks, 66 Mont. 346, 213 P. 600 (1923). 
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Intention is a question of fact. Harri_s__~._ Alaska_I_ir-:. Guarant·; 
Company, 510 P.Ld SUl \Alaska 1':!71J); Fer»uson v. Hilborn, 4U2 I','· 
914 (Okla. 1 965). 
It is unknown why the 1954 lease was executed if Phillip, 
really believed it had a leasehold estate on the oil and gas by 
virtue of the 1946 lease. Taking the facts as alleged and drawin~ 
inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs it is likely that Phillips 
believed it had no rights under the 1946 lease because the 1946 leas 
was void or had terminated or expired. It is possible that Phillii' 
intended that its interest in the subject parcel, if any, under the 
1946 lease, be confirmed and restated in the 1954 lease and merged 
therewith. The subsequent release of the 1954 lease would, 
therefore, have operated as a release of any interest held by 
Phillips under either the 1946 or 1954 lease. The district court, 
granting Phillips' Motion to Dismiss, refused to allow the Plaintlf: 
their right to verify this claim that the parties intended to merge 
Phillips' interest in the subject parcel in the 1954 lease. 
C. Phillips' acceptance of the 1954 lease acted as a 
surrender of its rights under the 1946 lease to the 
subject parcel and evidenced its intent to abandon those 
rights. 
In 1954 Phillips entered into ,m oil c1nd gas lease 
covering a portion of land it already purpurterl to have in 1 ':!'+ 1' • 
This parcel, which is the subject ,,f the Laws111t, l·cJnt.1111ed rl«• 
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',,J, excluded from participation in the production roydlties of the 
,.~velt Unit. The 1954 lease is complete in all its particulars. 
, 1 fact, the 1954 lease is contained on the same printed lease form, 
d standdrd Producers Form 88, which Phillips used in 1946. There are 
.stgciificant differences in the habendum clause, which allow Phillips 
t,1 hold the lease for only six months, within which time Phillips 
~ust commence reworking or redrilling a well on the property, with no 
right to extend the term by payment of delay rentals. 
Phillips, by the acceptance of this 1954 lease, surrendered 
whdt interest it claimed under the 1946 lease in the parcel of land. 
As stated in Diamanti v. Aubert, 68 Utah 582, 251 P. 373, 374 
The execution of the new lease to one of 
the original tenants, and its part 
performance, amounted to a surrender of the 
old lease by operation of law. 
The reason for this termination of a lease by surrender 
chrough the acceptance of a new lease is explained by Professor 
Surnrners in his treatise on oil and gas law: 
An oil and gas lease will be considered 
as surrendered by operation of law where 
acts of the parties are inconsistent with 
continued existence of the lease. Thus 
the acceptance of a new and valid lease 
bv the lessee during the existence of 
the new lease, where the parties intended 
the new lease to take effect at once, 
operates as a surrender of the first lease. 
Abandonment of the premises by the lessee 
and resumption of possession by the lessor 
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may amount to d s11rrenJer bv law. Whe' ·•0 r 
or not there has been a surrender bv 
operational law is a question of in~ent 
to be determineJ from the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case. 
The general effect of surrender of an oil 
and gas lease is to terminate the existing 
legal relations of the lessor and lessee 
created by the lease. 
3 Summers, Oil & Gas, Sections 524-525, at 451-452. 
Upon the failure to drill a producing well after the 195-
lease, Phillips abandoned the property. This intent to abandon is 
shown by the release of the 1954 lease in 1955, by the abandonmen'. 
the well as evidenced by the records filed with the USGS, and bv 
Phillips' total failure to do anything with the subject parcel for 
almost thirty years. Because of the action of the district court 
granting Phillips' Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs have been 
precluded from developing evidence which would support their clai" 
that Phillips has either surrendered or abandoned its interest in 
1954 lease. 
D. The 1954 lease is a substitute contract for the 1946 
lease and is a novation of Phillips' rights under the 
1 946 lease. 
At Page 4 of its Memorandum in Support of its ;foe ion c. 
Dismiss, Phillips postulates a reason for the execut i<in of th,· 
lease: 
The 1945 leases and the 1946 lease C<JflLdLtl 
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significantly different terms. The difference 
between these leases indicate that the real 
reason for the 1946 lease was to enable the 
parties to strike a different deal, as they 
apparently wished to do. 
If this were the reason for the 1946 lease, then why did 
f'hil 1 ips execute the 1954 lease if not to "strike a different deal." 
~hillips cannot consistently argue that new contractual agreements 
cuntained in the 1946 lease superseded and substituted for the 1945 
ledses, but that the 1954 lease did not have a similar effect on the 
1~46 lease for the subject parcel. The 1954 lease was clearly a 
s~~erseding contractual agreement whereby a leasehold on the subject 
~arcel was granted in return for very specific and different 
contractual obligations on the part of Phillips. The 1954 lease was, 
in effect, a novation of the 1946 lease as it pertained to the 
I~ 79 I : 
As stated in Elliot v. Whitney, 215 Kan. 256, 524 P.2d 699 
Novation may be broadly defined as a 
substitution of a new contract or obligation 
for an old one which is thereby extinguished 
(bb CJS, Novation, Section 1). It is 
a new contractual relation which has 
four requisites: a previous valid 
obligation, the parties must agree to the 
new contract, the new contract must be 
valid and the old obligation must be 
extinguished by substitution for it of the 
new one ( 1 5 Will is ton on Contracts, 3rd 
tdit1on, Section 1869; 66 CJS, Novation, 
Section Jl. 
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The 1954 lease was a new contract, valid at :.1e time <Jl 
execution. It "ranted Phillips a leasehold interest in the mineri_ 
estate, and Phillips took upon itself certain contractual obligatt 
relevant to what should be the mutual goal of the parties, product~ 
of oil and gas from the property. This new valid contract, the H-
lease, extinguished the 1946 lease as modified by the Unit 
Agreement and the March 11, 1952 Agreement as it pertained to the 
subject property. 
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the 1954 
lease clearly indicate the intent of the parties to enter into a 
substitute contract. Novation is a question of intent. Robison v. 
Hansen, 594 P.2d 867 (Utah 1979). Since intent is a question of 
fact, the district court, by dismissing the third cause of action, 
has denied the Plaintiffs their right to not only a day in court or. 
this issue, but also to a right to an adequate response to this 
question and an opportunity to pursue it through the judicial 
system. 
IV. THE 1946 LEASE \.JAS SEGREGATED BY THE CONTRACTION OF 
THE ROOSEVELT UNIT IN 1954 EXCLUDING THE SUBJECT 
PARCEL FROM THE UNIT AREA AND PARTICIPATING AREA, 
THEREBY EXCLUDING IT FROM A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF 
PRODUCTION ROYALTIES; AND THE EXCLUDED PARCEL COULD 
NOT BE HELD BEYOND THE PRIMARY TERM OF THE 194b LEAS[ 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE UNIT AGREEMENT. 
The Roosevelt Unit orginallv encomoelssed 34,71 l.27 .1cr• 
(Exhibit "A" to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss l. It was .1µpr·•" 1 ' 
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ftective October 15, 1951. (Exhibit "G" to Affidavit of Nicholas F. 
· :r,<'dn .1. The one and only participating area of the Roosevelt Unit 
·~els revised effective February 1952 to include 3,281.50 acres. 
'.E.xhibit "G" to Affidavit of Nicholas F. McKean). The Roosevelt Unit 
itself was contracted in size to the participating area effective 
8ecember 1, 19)4. (Exhibit "C" to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss). 
Df the lands described in the 1946 lease only the Nl /2 of the NWl /4 
uf Section 24 was included in the participating and unit area of the 
Roosevelt Unit. The remainder of the lands, which are the subject of 
chis lawsuit, were excluded from the unit and, consequently, from 
participation in the royalties. 
In connection with the formation of the Roosevelt Unit, 
Phillips wds required to go to Court to obtain a determination on the 
\'aliditv of its rights as Lessee to commit the leases it held to the 
unit. ln Phillips Petroleum Company v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th 
Cir. , 1954) it was ruled that under Sect ion 1 2 of the standard form 
Jil and gas leases employed by Phillips in the area, including the 
I :145 and 1 946 leases, Phillips had a right to unitize its leases. 
'~e court discussed the reasons for unitization and also the duties 
r~1e lessee owed to the lessors because of its right to unitize the 
''"'I. !'he court stated that unitization was a practical necessity in 
;11 dnd gas industrv. Rules and regulations governing the 
'''", dnd production from wells, coupled with the physical laws 
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affecting tne recovery of oi 1 and l:\dS dictate that pr<J; :~tion frui: 
pool or producing strata be worked as ~ whole, without regard tu L .. 
boundary units overlying the pool itself. 
Section 12 of the 1946 lease provided Phillips with the 
right to unitize, pool or combine any or all parts of the lease in. 
unit with the terms of the lease to be modified to conform with the 
terms and provisions of the Unit Agreement. Section 16 (d) of the 
Unit Agreement (Exhibit "A" to the Defendants' Memorandum in Suppor· 
of the Motion to Dismiss) states: 
Each lease, sublease or contract relating 
to the exploration, drilling, development or 
operation for oil or gas of any land commited 
to this agreement, which, by its terms might 
expire prior to the termination of this 
agreement, is hereby extended beyond such 
term so provided therein so that it may 
be continued in full force and effect 
for and during the term of this agreement, 
subject to the rental provisions of Section 
13 hereof. 
Phillips has restricted the unit operations to the uoper 
formations (i.e. the Green River Formation) and exploration or 
development of the lower formations have been curtailed up to the 
present, even though these lower formations have shown potential E· 
production, as alleged in the Amended Complaint. The oi 1 compank 
have ignored requests by land owners and the USGS to develop these 
formations. 
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Section 13 of the Unit Agreement, as it relates to those 
enldl provisions, states as follows: 
The parties hereto holding interest in 
privately owned lands (the term "privately 
owned land" as used herein shall not be 
construed to include Indian land) within 
the unit area consent and agree, to the 
extent of their respective interests, that 
each lease thereon which is committed hereto 
may be continued in effect beyond the primary 
term of such lease and during the term of this 
agreement, provided, however, that as to any 
portion of privately owned land subject to a 
lease committed to this agreement which lies 
outside a participating area the lessee shall 
pay the delay rentals provided in the lease, 
reduced in the proportion that the mineral or 
royalty acre interest subject to such lease 
in the land located in the participating area 
bears to the total mineral or royalty acre 
interest in all lands subject to such lease, 
in the time, manner and amount provided by 
such lease, subject to the right of surrender 
provided for in Section 29. 
Section 16 states: 
The terms, conditions and provisions of all 
leases, subleases and other contracts 
relating to exploration, drilling, development 
or operation of oil or gas of lands committed 
to this agreement are hereby expressly 
modified and amended to the extent necessary 
to make the same conform to the provisions 
hereof, but otherwise to remain in full force 
and effect, 
~ rom the language contained in the Unit Agreement, if there 
lands ,if the lease excluded from the participating area, the Unit 
·'~1nerit treats them differently than those within the participating 
rhev are not ~iven production royalties in proportion to their 
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size with the participating area, but Jelay rentals <-1r,, raiJ in 
conformity with the underlying lease. !'he Unit Agreement alsu ,L1 
that the terms of the leases are modified to the extent necessarv 
conform with the Unit Agreement, but the leases otherwise are to 
remain in full force and effect. 
From this it would appear that delay rentals were intendc 
to hold that portion of the 1946 lease lying outside the 
participating area. Delay rentals will be paid in accordance with 
the lease, but the lease provides that delay rentals can only hold 
the lands for the primary term, and no longer. The Uni c Agreement 
does not require holding lands outside the unit beyond the primarv 
term of the leases covering such lands. The Unit Agreement is not 
concerned with lands outside the unit area. Therefore, it is 
entirely consistent that the clause in the Unit Agreement providinz 
for the holding of lands by the payment of delay rentals is limitec 
to the primary term, and that unless separate wells are drilled, ;w 
production is obtained, on those lands outside the unit, those lane' 
will be released from the lease. 
The provision in the Unit Agreement requiring the pavmec'. 
of delay rentals is unusual in unit agreements of this type covert'. 
lands in this area (Transcript at 41 ). This interpretation is 
entirely consistent with the March 11, 1952 Agretement \vhict1 re 1 '' 
Phillips to commence the drilling of a well on th1e Lrnds e~<1'1'i' 
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c the Roosevelt Unit before the expiration of the primary term of 
, '"-' I Y..;b lease. 
It is evident from the actions of the parties that this 
i~terpretation of the Unit Agreement was adopted by the parties. In 
a letter to the USGS, the unit operator spoke of the necessity to 
drill a well on the 1946 lease before the expiration of the primary 
term. (Exhibit "C" to the Supplement to the Response to Defendants' 
~otion to Dismiss). After the expiration of the primary term 
?h1llips obtained a new lease from the Plaintiffs' predecessors in 
interest requiring it to redrill a well on the lands excluded from 
the participating area of the Roosevelt Unit. At that time Phillips 
acted as it it had no lease on, or interest in, the subject parcel 
excluded from the participating area. 
Phillips cannot now, almost thirty years later, claim it 
has an interest in the subject parcel. The subject parcel was 
separated and treated differently from the other lands covered by the 
lj~6 lease oy its exclusion from production of the Roosevelt Unit, 
anJ, consequently, it cannot now be held by Phillips solely by virtue 
ot production from the Roosevelt Unit. By treating the subject lands 
n Deing held bv production from the Roosevelt Unit, the district 
rt w~s in error, and its Judgment dismissing the fourth cause of 
•f the Amended Complaint must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
As ca11 t"le -..:;1._-'er1 t)v tilt' ,Jis('11-..;...;1\ 1 11 l1t-'t1·1n, r111s l."> 
case, dealing with corn pl LCdteJ, dnd ,_i ft en st:e-rn1 n~i_,, L1Jnt rr:t<i LL r:_ )~ 
transactions occuring over thirty vears ago. To Ji sm1ss s11ch d 
at the pleading stage, without allowing the p,uties an opo<lrtun1: 
distill the facts through discovery, and witnout the d1str1ct co 1F 
having the benefit of hearing and weighing what would undouhtedl·1 
voluminous and contradictory evidence, is clearly erroneous. 
The interpretation and legal effect of manv of the 
transactions sued upon must be determined according to the intenc 
the participants at the time. For example, what W<>s the intent,,: 
the parties in executing the 1 946 oil and gas lease·; 1...:as the I~~· 
lease intended to relate back to the 1945 leases, which were v01i 
Why diJ the parties execute an oil and ?,as lease in 1954 cuveric. 0 
lands it now claims it held by virtue of the 1 ':J4b lease' l'hese ,. 
just a few of the important questions which must be rnswere;d thr.· 
discovery and trial, and which cannot, and should not, be dec1Je 
the district court on a motion to dismiss. 
For the foregoing reasons the Plaint1frs-Appellants 
respectfully submit that the decision of the district co11rt -;rJro· 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should l!e l''-'Versc·d rnd rh1s c' "c 
remanded. 
DATED t:t1is 23~~a:; 1Jt J111H·, I~.~ l. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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